I. INTRODUCTION 'When viewed from a modern perspective of political correctness, U.S. history contains at'least two well-known and unfortunate chapters: the reprehensible treatment of the Native Americans' and the barbaric industry of slavery. 2 Although one may dismiss the disturbing events of those eras as the distant past, a less known and more recent period of unpleasant history involved the United States mistreating the indigenous people of the Marshall Islands. 3 From 1946 to 1958, the Marshallese people 4 endured sixty-seven experimental nuclear tests, 5 conducted by the United States, that damaged the health of many Marshallese citizens and forced a significant number of them from their homes. 6 The most infamous device, code-named "Bravo," produced a crater 6240 feet in diameter and 164 feet deep, illustrating the devastating force of these tests. 7 Although it is tempting to simply categorize the events surrounding the U.S. nuclear testing imposed on the Marshall Islands as yet another shameful chapter in U.S. history, that categorization may be too hasty. Even supporters of the Marshallese people acknowledge that the arsenal developed during the testing program provided the powerful nuclear deterrent responsible for victory in the Cold War. 8 Justifications for the tests, however, are beyond the scope of this note.
What remains is over half-a-century of suffering by the Marshallese people due to intentional acts by the U.S. government. Although the United States accepted responsibility for its actions in the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Compact), 9 the provisions of that agreement have proven inadequate to fully repay the Marshallese citizens for the damage done to their homeland or to provide for their medical care. 0 Accordingly, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) announced its intention to submit to the U.S. Congress a request for additional funding, a process provided in the Changed Circumstances provision" 1 of the Section 177 Agreement, a This note seeks to analyze the RMI's allegation that the provisions of the Compact and Section 177 Agreement are manifestly inadequate, and subsequently to examine whether Congress should grant additional funding to address the alleged harm that has arisen from the nuclear testing. Part II of this note explains how the United States arrived at its present position of culpability by abusing a former trust relationship with the Marshall Islands. Part III provides background information on the Marshallese injuries and suffering caused by the nuclear testing. Part IV examines the United StatesRepublic of the Marshall Islands Compact of Free Association and subsidiary Section 177 Agreement. Part V analyzes current allegations of inadequacy of the Compact and Section 177 Agreement. Part V also addresses the implications, to that analysis, of the U.S. Department of Energy's withholding of information. Finally, Part VI recommends that the U.S. Congress conduct a prompt evaluation of whether or not to grant additional funding to the Marshall Islands. That evaluation should result in granting needed funds due to the United States' fiduciary and moral obligations.
II. THE UNITED STATES AS TRUSTEE
At the conclusion of World War II, the United Nations wanted to aid the development of the newly liberated peoples in Africa and Micronesia. "s To accomplish that goal, the United Nations established the International Trusteeship System, 6 under which members of the United Nations administered the trusteeship states.' 7 The Trusteeship System required the trustees to help the trust territories develop autonomous systems of 14 [Vol. 11: 1 ENDLESS RECONCILIATION government and to aid in the trust territories' economic development. 8 United Nations members who accepted the trusteeship responsibility also acknowledged a "sacred trust obligation" whose beneficiaries were the trust territory's inhabitants. 9 In general, the United Nations granted trustees expansive authority in administering the trust territories. ' The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be: a. to further international peace and security; b.
to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; c.
to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and d.
to ensure equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80. U.N. CHARTER 27 The most powerful of the tests, "Bravo,"28 released the explosive power of one thousand Hiroshima bombs. 29 Bravo was part of the United States coordinated program of atomic and nuclear weapons testing conducted under the" control of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).' Because of the expansive control granted to the United States as trustee, U.S. military leaders and AEC officials took the actions they deemed necessary and then, on several occasions, withheld information that was damaging to their interests. 3 
A.
Physical Suffering
The majority of the physical injuries traceable to the nuclear testing did not result from a one-time exposure to radiation. However, the extreme amounts of radiation released from Bravo 37 caused acute injuries to particular victims in addition to contributing to the long-term physical injuries of the Marshallese people. 38 In preparing for that test, scientists recommended that the Rongelap and Ailinginae atolls, several hundred miles east of the Bikini test site, be placed in the "danger zone" 3 9 for Bravo. 40 The U.S. Interior Department, however, was reluctant to displace islanders, as was done 
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during the earlier Operation Crossroads. 4 Accordingly, the Interior Department and the AEC drew the danger zone boundaries precisely to exclude those atolls. 42 Bravo exploded with a force three times greater than its creators expected. 43 U.S. officials claimed that it was an "unpredicted" shift in wind direction" that sent the massive cloud of radioactive fallout eastward covering approximately seven thousand square miles. 4 Fallout from the test showered 28 American servicemen on Rongerik, the 236 inhabitants of Rongelap and Utrik atolls, and other Marshallese camping at Ailinginae Atoll. 46 The U.S. military evacuated the servicemen to Kwajalein Atoll the day after Bravo but did not rescue the people of Rongelap and Utrik for two to three days. 47 The fallout exposed the Marshallese victims to radioactivity that equaled the dose received by Japanese citizens located less than two miles from ground zero at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 48 Almost all of the Rongelapese displayed the usual symptoms of radiation poisoning: hair loss, skin lesions, and lowered white blood cell counts. The Atomic Energy Commission tried to keep the disaster a secret 2 and did not admit the gravity of the incident for decades. 3 The injuries and pain caused by acute exposure represents only one portion of the physical injuries caused by the radiation exposure. Scientists and doctors continue to compile data on the non-acute exposure related illnesses, which are only now being identified and tallied due to the long latency periods,' poor health care for the first generation of victims, 5 5 and the emergence of a new generation of victims from subsequent exposure.56 RMI officials emphasize that sixty-six explosions other than Bravo 57 contributed to radiation and trace chemicals on each of the Marshall Islands, raising the probability of diseases caused by non-acute exposure. 8 The RMI continues to assess the total magnitude of the long-term injuries. Partially in response to devastating errors by U.S. officials, including prematurely resettling people to islands which were not safe, 59 the leukemia.") 50. See WEISGALL, supra note 4, at 304.
See id. at 303.
52. See id. When the information was uncovered and ended up in a Cincinnati newspaper, the AEC issued a statement claiming that "during the course of a routine atomic test," some Marshallese "were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity," but "there were no bums" and "all are reported well." Id. at 303-04. 
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RMI initiated the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological Study.G° Several obstacles exist, however, to amassing the final tally of injuries. First, U.S. officials have primarily focused upon only those victims who were acutely exposed. 6 Secondly, many of the radiation monitoring and medical reports were produced by the same agencies that have both withheld information and at certain points lied, thereby making it difficult for Marshallese citizens to trust the data. ' Third, an unknown quantity of information remains classified.6 Finally, funding deficiencies limit the RMI's ability to collect additional data.' As the RMI continues its efforts to collect the needed data, Marshallese citizens with injuries they believe to be related to the nuclear testing present their claims to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, a court created by the Section 177 Agreement.6
B. Non-Physical Injuries
Aside from causing physical injuries and disease, the nuclear testing forced many Marshallese from their homes. The Utrik people can choose to live on their atoll without concern that their health will be affected by radiological exposure. The Rongelap people could choose to resettle without concern that their health will be affected by radiological exposure if they 1) conducted a limited scrape of surface soils in the village areas and 2) apply potassium fertilizer to areas where food is growing. This mitigation technique, referred to as the combined option, is the basis for the resettlement program being implemented at Rongelap today. We have recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Rongelap leadership to provide radiological monitoring of the ongoing resettlement activities. The
[Vol. 11:1 remain there today, unable to return home.' The weapons testing inflicted additional non-physical injuries on the Marshallese people by reducing their homeland to a nuclear wasteland. 78 Prior to the testing, the Marshallese people enjoyed a close relationship to their islands and atolls, each of which sustained some level of environmental degradation as a result of the nuclear testing. 79 The environmental damage sustained by some atolls continues to render food that is grown there lethal . 8 Fifty-four years after the nuclear testing began, radiation prevents many islanders from safely returning home because they would be subjected to continuos exposure from the soil, water, and air. 8 In a fate worse than contamination, the nuclear tests destroyed some islands completelyY u As stipulated under the Section 177 Agreement, Marshallese citizens may submit claims for these property damages to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal.'
Bikini people could choose to resettle without concern that their health will be affecte by radiological exposure if they, like the Rongelap, 1) scrape the village areas and 2) apply potassium fertilizer to food growing areas. The Enewetak people have been resettled on Enewetak atoll. Bioassay and whole body counting results have confirmed that radiation doses on Eniwetak Island, where resettlement has occurred, are at or near world background levels and present no health consequences to the population. If the Enewetak people decide to, resettle Enjebi Island, DOE recommends using the combined option as at Rongelap and Bikini atolls for mitigation. Id. 
See

IV. THE COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION
A. The Compact
In the decades following the end of the nuclear testing program, the U.S. and Marshallese governments slowly progressed toward Marshallese independence" and made initial efforts to provide health care to the many victims of the testing.' The most significant step toward compensation to radiation victims, however, occurred simultaneously with attainment of RMI sovereignty when the Marshall Islands and 
B. The Section 177 Agreement
In Section 177 of the Compact, the United States accepted responsibility for the damage the U.S. nuclear weapons testing caused in the Marshall Islands. 5 9 As detailed in Section 177 of the Compact, a separate agreement for "the just and adequate settlement of claims," commonly known as the "Section 177 Agreement," was created to implement Section 177 of the CompactL
The United States intended the Section 177 Agreement to provide a full settlement of all claims arising from the nuclear testing program conducted in the Marshall Islands during the trusteeship period. 9 Article X, Section 1 of the Section 177 Agreement provides:
This Agreement constitutes the full settlement of all claims, past, present and future, of the Government, citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which are based upon, arise out of, or are in any way related to the Nuclear Testing Program, and which are against the United States, its agents, employees, contractors and citizens and nationals, and of all claims for equitable or any other relief in connection with such claims... which may be pending RMI is a sovereign power, but the United States has granted the RMI access to the services of over forty U.S. domestic programs and a large per capita funding. See Boyce testimony, supra note 5. The United States takes responsibility for the RMI's security in return for foreclosure of third country access to the Marshall Islands for military purposes, known as "strategic denial." Id According to the DOE, (1) 98. See Oscar Debrum testimony, supra note 64. See also Weisgall testimony, supra note 59 (referring to the health care funds as "wholly inadequate").
99. See Oscar Debrum testimony, supra note 64. See also Tony A. Debrum testimony, supra note 13 (explaining that the RMI desperately needs more financial assistance from the United States).
100. Tony A. Debrum testimony, supra note 13.
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ENDLESS RECONCILIATION
A. Loss or Damage to Property and Person of the Citizens of the Marshall Islands, Resulting from the Nuclear Testing Program, Which Arose or was Discovered after the Effective Date of the Section 177 Agreement
It is difficult to separate damages resulting from the nuclear testing which arose or were discovered after execution of the Section 177 Agreement from those that the RMI should have reasonably known about at the time of the agreement's formation. RMI 
Id.
104. See Tony A. Debrum testimony, supra note 13. The DOE medical program, which receives almost $2,000,000 annually, is limited to 174 people -those from Rongelap and Utirik who are "acutely exposed," as defined by DOE. Id. RMI officials object to the fact that although Congress has taken responsibility for the damage resulting from the entire testing program, it has limited DOE medical care to only two affected atolls and eligibility to participate is limited to exposure solely from the Bravo test. See id.
105. While arguing for expansion of the DOE's program, Minister Debrum hinted at the underlying anger of the Marshallese people by stating, "I won't discuss the outrage and humiliation of the people for being forced into medical experiments designed to benefit
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citizens based on cumulative exposure from the testing program because radioactive fallout from the tests contaminated all of the Marshall Islands.t10 The RMI named numerous groups "exposed " " to medium or low levels of radiation that need the DOE's care but are not included in the DOE's definition of "exposed."1 8 The RMI claims that the expense of caring for all of the exposed groups is beyond its financial capability. 09
In the Compact, the U.S. Congress reaffirmed the United States' commitment, through the DOE's program, to the 174 Bravo victims mandated by previous law." 0 It is unlikely that the RMI did not realize the scope of the DOE's programs at the time of the Compact's formation because the specific provisions were part of the Compact. The RMI emphasizes the importance of monitoring the environment of all atolls, concentrating on the food chain and the health of all the affected peoples."' The RMI asserts that it cannot adequately provide for the exposed scientists not the patients because after years of this practice, DOE finally agreed to terminate the medical program run by a U.S. weapons laboratory." Tony A. Debrum testimony, supra note 13.
106. See id.
Among those groups exposed:
(1) Marshallese test site workers who supported the testing and clean-up activities on Enewetak and Bikini, including the most dangerous type of activities, such as ground-moving activities that re-suspended plutonium in the air; (2) The people of Bikini, Enewetak and Ronglep who were prematurely resettled; (3) the Rongelapese "control" group; (4) The people of Ailuk, Likiep, Meiit, Wotie, Wotho, Ujae and Uielang who received levels of radiation in the vicinity of the people from Utirik; (5) The children of the prematurely resettled communities whose parents were exposed to radiation and who were born into highly radioactive environments; (6) Any second illness in the 174 exposed Marshallese. Id 108. The differences concerning the DOE's definition of exposed is part of an ongoing debate over radiation measurement and definitions. See id The RMI claims that Marshallese citizens have been harmed by inaccurate radiation measurement and definition by the U.S. government. See id. Atolls such as Mejit, Ailuk, Likiep, Wotho, and Ujelang fall into the Department of Energy's category of the "least amount of radioactive atoms." Id. As a result, they are disregarded in all medical care or environmental monitoring programs under the Compact. See id. The DOE's category, however, of "the least amount of radioactive atoms" in the Marshall Islands exceeds acceptable radiation exposure levels in the United States hundreds of times. See id. The RMI is forced to care for the radiation-related needs of all atoll communities beyond those recognized as acutely exposed due to the testing program. 111. See Tony A. Debrum testimony, supra note 13. See also Oscar Debrum testimony, supra note 64 (reiterating the "pressing need" for more medical surveillance and radiological monitoring activities despite the exhaustion of the funding provided under Section 177 Agreement). The program provided only "intermittent medical care" to the mandated patients and "had limited prospects of making sustained contributions to either their health or public health in general." Id However, beginning in 1998, the DOE implemented a new program with the local governments of Rongelap and Utrik atolls to provide medical care that would be more responsive to their needs. See id. The program's goals include: (1) Providing preventative and innovative healthcare for the mandated population; (2) enhanced continuity in the delivery of healthcare; (3) establishment of a community advisory process for the program; (4) delivery of healthcare in a culturally appropriate manner; and improve overall service. See id.
115. The Marshallese and U.S. governments will soon be involved in negotiations; which will be held prior to the expiration of the 24 Certain U.S. officials have criticized the Marshall Islands for failing to establish eligibility criteria for the Four Atoll Program." z The RMI contends that because the DOE's care is restricted and the Marshallese public health infrastructure is stretched beyond its capacity, virtually all of the people from the eligible atolls sought to enroll in the Four Atoll Program. The RMI further asserts that it is hard to imagine anyone from the four atolls who is "not affected by the consequences" of the testing program.
1 27 Additionally, the RMI asserts that it did not foresee at the Compact's signing the extent to which health care costs would increase annually. 2 3"'' In addition, the Preamble to the Section 177 Agreement refers to the language of Public Laws 95-134 and 96-205, purporting to establish an "integrated, comprehensive" health care system. 3 4 From the language of those laws, the RMI government should have reasonably expected that the funding and programs provided by the Compact and the Section 177 Agreement would provide the "comprehensive" health care system promised. The RMI government stated that it does not have the expertise or the financial resources to provide health care for all its people suffering from nuclear testing related injuries."' Minister Debrum stated, "we are almost no closer today than we were at the beginning of our relationship to providing for the health care needs of our radiation victims."136 "Despite the fact that we have some of the highest incidences of radiogenic illnesses and cancers in the world, we don't have adequate hospitals, diagnostic equipment or even a cancer registry program in the Marshall Islands."1 37
D. Claims Inadequately Compensated by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal
The Nuclear Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) is the mechanism created by the Section 177 Agreement to remedy property and personal injury claims resulting from the nuclear testing. 39 In the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990 (often referred to as the "Downwinders' Act"), " the U.S. Congress found that fallout emitted from the nuclear tests conducted in Nevada exposed American civilians "to radiation that is presumed to have generated an excess of cancers among those individuals." 4 ' "In view of that finding, the Congress established a presumptive program of compensation for specified diseases contracted by the people who were physically present in the 'affected area' during the periods of atmospheric testing in Nevada."42 The Tribunal determined that it would only be equitable if the Marshallese victims received the same type of statutory remedy. ' 3 Accordingly, the Tribunal adopted compensable medical condition regulations providing for awards to people physically present in the Marshall Islands during the testing period and for those who were also medically diagnosed as having one of the thirty-four conditions.'" The Tribunal's presumptive program is warranted, according to the RMI government, because of the need for an efficient and cost-effective system of resolving personal injury claims where proof of causation would often be impossible because large amounts of the exposure data is not available. 45 The presumptive standard applies to the entire Marshall Islands, not simply the atolls which have suffered the most severe contamination. 16 The Tribunal concluded that given the vastly greater radioactive fallout of the tests in the Marshall Islands compared with those in Nevada, it was clearly justified in extending the presumption of exposure to everyone living in the Marshall Islands during the testing period."' Oscar Debrum, Chairman of the Tribunal, asserts that the funding allocated to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal under the Section 177 Agreement is manifestly inadequate,' 48 thereby preventing the Tribunal from fulfilling its mandate of compensating the Marshallese victims. 4 9 He claims there have been far more cases of radiogenic illnesses presented to the Tribunal than either nation was prepared for when they originally negotiated the Compact. ' The situation is complicated by the realization that many radiation-related illnesses, latent for decades, are now beginning to appear breast, cancer of the pharynx, cancer of the esophagus, cancer of the stomach, cancer of the small intestine, cancer of the pancreas, multiple melanoma, lymphomas, cancer of the bile ducts, cancer of the gall bladder, cancer of the liver, cancer of the colon, cancer of the urinary bladder, tumors of the salivary gland, non-malignant thyroid nodular disease, cancer of the ovary, unexplained hypothyroidism, severe growth retardation due to thyroid damage, unexplained bone marrow failure, meningioma, radiation sickness, beta bums, severe mental retardation, unexplained hyperarathyroidism, tumors of the parathyroid gland, bronchial cancer, cancer of the brain, cancer of the central nervous system, cancer of the kidney, cancer of the rectum, cancer of the cecum, non-melanoma skin cancer.
Id.
145 
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in the Marshallese population.' 5 ' As of April 30, 1999, compensation totaling $67,700,000 had been awarded to 1613 individuals.' 5 2 This amount represents approximately $22 million more that the $45,750,000 provided under the Section 177 Agreement for payment of compensation by the Tribunal during the fifteen year period of the Compact of Free Association. 5 3 In addition, the Tribunal has yet to award any compensation for property damage,"s although three major class action suits are currently pending in the Tribunal's procedural system. '55
Due to funding deficiencies, distribution of actual payments has necessarily been reduced. Funding shortages forced the Tribunal to reduce the pro rata annual payments in the years 1996 through1998 to 2%, which brought the cumulative payment to 61 % for all awards that had been approved prior to October 1, 1996.156 For awards made on or after October 1, 1996, the Tribunal established a new initial payment rate of 25% of the net total of each award.
5 7 In summary, the actual payment status for the majority (1274 people) of the Tribunal recipients is 61 % of their award. ' Individuals awarded compensation between October 1, 1996 and September 30, 1998 have received only 40% of their awards. 
Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
ENDLESS RECONCILIATION
E. Such Injuries Were Not and Could Not Reasonably Have Been Identified as of the Effective Date of This Agreement
In 1983, at the time of the Compact's finalization, the RMI did not have all available information regarding the nuclear tests. 163 Some information remains classified today, such as data pertaining to Operation Redwing and Operation Hardtack I.1' Furthermore, the DOE did not release many of its documents concerning the testing program until after 1983.165 Perhaps in an effort to renew the Marshallese faith in U.S. truthfulness, 66 the DOE recently implemented a program to make available one-million pages of nuclear testing documents through the DOE's Web site. 7 These documents allow direct access by the RMI and the public to this important information.'" However, a million pages of scientifically complex information, made available long after the Compact was signed, is not much help to the health of the Marshallese people. RMI citizens will quite reasonably question whether they can trust any data offered by the DOE." Other non-DOE sanctioned data also became available after the Compact's formation. 7 Damage disclosed to the RMI regarding Bikini Atoll serves as one example. ' But expertise, such as that possessed by the DOE, is needed to interpret the findings.
It is not clear, however, how significant this information is to RMI's present assertion of injuries that "were not and could not reasonably have been identified as of the effective date" of the Compact. Only a careful review of the scientific data could determine if the new information reveals greater injury to the Marshallese people than the governments expected when the Compact was signed. The DOE's actions, however, will likely arouse extra sympathy in the U.S. Congress for the Marshallese plight.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Changed Circumstances provision of the Section 177 Agreement does not legally obligate the U.S. Congress to address a RMI request for additional funding."2 However, Congress has been sympathetic to the Marshallese plight.' 7 3 Accordingly, Congress will most likely examine the Marshallese grievances. In so doing, Congress will logically look to the requirements, or elements, of the Changed Circumstances provision to evaluate whether the RMI presents a prima facie case showing that the terms of the Section 177 Agreement are manifestly inadequate. An affirmative answer to that question would necessitate the requisite full scale investigation for a Congressional remedy. 74 In the RMI's plea to Congress, it could credibly argue that injuries have been discovered which were caused by the nuclear testing but were not discovered until after the Compact and Section 177 Agreement were finalized.t 75 Furthermore, the RMI could reasonably argue that at least a portion of these injuries were not reasonably foreseeable due to the wealth of data that has become available due to new scientific studies,' 76 declassification of DOE documents, " and the unknown extent of radiodonic diseases. 7
Whether or not the RMI can produce sufficient evidence to convince Congress that the Section 177 Agreement is "manifestly inadequate" is unclear. That phrase is not defined in the Section 177 Agreement or in the Compact. In ordinary usage, manifest means "obvious," and adequate may be defined as "suitable or sufficient." "t Thus, a common sense meaning of that phrase would be "obviously not sufficient." 180 What is clear, however, is that Congress should be lenient in applying that standard to the RMI's petition for funding.
The disaster inflicted upon the Marshallese for the last fifty-four years has created a moral obligation. The United States owes an immense debt to
